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Distributive Injustice and Private Law
ADITI BAGCHI*

Of what consequence is distributive injustice to private law? It may
be surprising that prevailing academic opinion is that distributive justice
is irrelevant to private law.' This position is less surprising once one
begins to work out the contrary intuition, i.e., that distributive injustice
alters our rights and obligations under private law.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Matthew
Adler, Ed Baker, Stephen Perry, and Chris Sanchirico for very helpful comments and discussion. This
paper also benefited greatly from comments received at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
faculty workshop series.
I. Numerous legal economists have advocated that private law exclude considerations of
distributive justice. E.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-27 (2d
ed. 1989); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 97-10 (1993);Louis Kaplow

& Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994) (arguing that because legal rules designed to redistribute
income produce distortions resulting from the redistribution itself as well as inefficiencies in the
activities regulated by the legal rules, it is "appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on
efficiency and to ignore the distribution of income in offering normative judgments"). Legal
philosophers also tend to advocate such a separation. E.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW 80 (1995) ("As an autonomous form of justice, corrective justice operates on entitlements
without addressing the justice of the underlying distribution."); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective
Justice and Its Relation to DistributiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 6o7 (1992) ("The justification of
abstract right and of its principles of acquisition does not depend in the least on the prior satisfaction
of any distributive requirements of background justice."); Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship
Between Corrective and DistributiveJustice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 237,
247 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) ("[Corrective justice is] an independent moral principle that operates
within the context of distributive justice, but not as part of it."); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and
Public Justice:Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (2006) ("Both tort and property protect what
people happen to have, without any thought about how they got it or what they should have from a
moral point of view. The law attends to the form of the transaction or holding, rather than the needs
or interests of the parties to it."). For additional discussion of this viewpoint, see also Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargaining Power,41 MD. L. REV. 563, 584 (1982), stating that "[t]he
acceptance of the distributive motive into the discussion of what rules of agreement should be in force
has never been more than partial and oblique." But see Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing
Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, IO96-97 (I97i); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of

Redistributive Legal Rules, 5i VAND. L. REV. t653, 1656-57 (1998); Kevin A. Kordana & David H.
Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 60O (2oo5); Anthony T. Kronman,
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 474-75 (i980); Chris William Sanchirico,
Deconstructingthe New Efficiency Rationale,86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, IOO8-14 (2001).
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The difficulty is translating the demands of social justice into the
rights and responsibilities of particular persons toward one another (i.e.,
agent-specific reasons for liability) in a context where only the
entitlements of two people are in dispute. Distributive justice entails a
just distribution of resources throughout a political community, and is
usually thought best achieved through broad-based measures aimed at
moving resources between groups through tax and transfer.' The
demands of distributive justice speak to the community as a whole and
transfers are usually made collectively; the state does not pair wealthy
with poor individuals and direct each individual to hand some portion of
her resources over to another individual. It is generally up to the state to
figure out what to do about distributive justice and individuals are free to
dispose of their post-tax income as they see fit.
Behind the affirmative arguments in favor of using the state's
powers of tax and transfer to effect redistribution, powerful intuitions
regarding the boundaries of individual responsibility and its fundamental
role in private law have been taken to limit the domain of distributive
justice. In private law, individuals are held to account for the losses of
others, and we must be able to say that she who is being held to account
for a loss is in some sense responsible for it. We may disagree on the
nature of responsibility and its ultimate justificatory function in law, but
we can hardly conceive of the machinery of private law without some
notion of responsibility that explains why we may make some individuals
pay, but not others. Even if we reject the notion that such responsibility
defines the scope of legal liability, theorists of corrective justice are
persuasive that a person is responsible "for a harmful outcome to which
she causally contributed if and only if she had the capacity to foresee that
outcome and the ability and opportunity to take steps to avoid it." 3 In
pinning liability to responsibility, the law recognizes "the value of choice:
that is to say, the value for an agent of having what happens (including
what obligations are incurred) depend on how he or she responds when
presented with a set of alternatives under certain conditions."4
Distributive injustice, as a general matter, does not necessarily reflect
any given individual's choice and thus fails to generate individual
responsibility of this type. Stephen Perry and others have argued that
"[i]f distributive justice gives rise to reasons for action for individuals, as
opposed to the state, they are presumably agent-general reasons." 5 That
is, "they pertain to all persons within society (or to society as a whole). 6
2. E.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note i.
3. Perry, supranote i, at 238.
4. T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts,in THE THEORY OF CONTRAcr LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86, 112
(Peter Benson ed., 2oo0).
5. Perry, supra note I, at 238-39.
6. Id. at 244; see also Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGILL
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Making defendants pay plaintiffs solely because of their respective
economic positions, or more practically, making defendants pay more or
less in light of their respective wealth, might mitigate the moral
arbitrariness manifest in their relative circumstances, but it does so at the
expense of arbitrariness within the groups of the well- and worse-off. To
be sure, arbitrariness is rampant in social life. But it is nevertheless a
strong weight against any institution or practice that would exacerbate it.
And yet the question remains: what happens when the state does not
get distribution right? That is, are individuals free to do what they will
with their post-tax resources even where the state has not answered
adequately the demands of distributive justice? Does the concept of
individual responsibility compete so radically with distributive justice
that it bars any accommodation of distributive aims in private law? In
this Article, I attempt to justify the qualifying effect of distributive
injustice on rights and responsibilities otherwise secure under private
law. Excessive inequality does not simply identify the basic structure of
society as unjust.7 It creates moral risk for individuals operating within
that structure. Most theorists vaguely gesture toward the possibility that
gross injustice might call for redistribution through private law, but they
implicitly offer an implausible choice: either distributive justice takes
over when there is gross distributive injustice, or it does nothing, in all
cases short of moral crisis.8 My argument applies not just in the extreme
case, but also in a wider set of circumstances, including those in which
most societies find themselves. Even in familiar circumstances,
distributive injustice infects legal rules which would otherwise be not
only just, but optimal. Whatever the relationship between distributive
L.J. 91, 93 (1995) ("Corrective justice concerns the rectification of losses owing to private wrongs. In
contrast, distributive justice concerns the general allocation of resources, benefits, opportunities, and
the like. The duty to repair under corrective justice is agent-specific-only wrongdoers need make up
the losses of others. The duties imposed by distributive justice are, in contrast, agent-generaleveryone has a duty to create and sustain just distributions."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of
Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 206, 257 (rejecting
redistribution in contract law as "completely haphazard"); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the
Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995) ("Critics further argue that the welfare system
provides a more equitable way to redistribute wealth than legal rules do, because legal rules
redistribute wealth only to people who happen to be injured or people in the class of those likely to be
injured in a way that can be redressed by courts-a small and arbitrarily selected portion of the needy
population.").
7. 1 do not attempt to assess the merits of the leading theories that specify what level of
inequality is unjust. In general, I rely on John Rawls' A Theory of Justice as a persuasive account of
how much inequality is morally tolerable. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8. See, e.g., Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 6, at 93 ("[A] requirement that unjust losses be
rectified only makes sense provided holdings are not entirely unjust."); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 259
("Contract law as an institution is acceptable only if the basic structure of the society is fair. If the
basic social structure is unfair, rules designed in part to accomplish corrective justice within that
structure, including the rules of contract law, may not be justifiab!e.").
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justice and private law in ideal theory, a failure to meet our obligations of
distributive justice destabilizes our other rights and obligations toward
one another.9
Others have developed the argument that individuals are not
morally free to keep their winnings in the market place.'0 My argument is
different in that it focuses not on the individual's moral position but on
the law's treatment of that position. In particular, I am concerned with
how distributive injustice affects individuals' legal rights and obligations.
Unlike most others who have attempted to defend a role for distributive
justice in private law, my argument respects the principle that an
individual should not be legally held to account for another's loss in
private law unless she is responsible for the loss; distributive justice does
not swallow private law whole." But a background of distributive
injustice properly informs our understanding of what constitutes
responsible conduct, and thus, the scope of otherwise secure legal
entitlements.
The qualified nature of private law rights under conditions of
distributive injustice stems from the force of what I will call imperfect
social rights. Imperfect rights are not held against any single person, and
when violated, they do not ground a claim for any particular quantum of
redress. Imperfect social rights are claims arising under the principles of
distributive justice. Because imperfect social rights have been asserted
primarily as claims against the state, and because they do not lend
themselves to constitutional adjudication, they have had little traction. In
this Article, I will emphasize that any claim on the state is derivative
from social rights held against other citizens. Even those who believe that
individuals have justiciable social rights against the state should concede
an imperfect right against other individuals in the ubiquitous case of
partial compliance by the state.

9. See Liam B. Murphy, Institutionsand the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1998).
In arguing that individuals have a duty to promote distributive justice directly, e.g., through direct
voluntary transfers, Murphy notes: "What we will always appeal to in practice are principles of
nonideal theory. If our theory has implausible implications for the nonideal case, the theory may have
some intellectual interest, but it would fail as a normative political theory." Id. at 279; see also Michael
Phillips, Reflections on the Transitionfrom Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory, 19 NoOs 551, 554 (1985) ("[I]t
cannot safely be assumed that perfect ideals.., are superior to imperfect ideals for evaluating the
moral rules and political institutions of the world in which we live.").
so. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
o.
AFF. 3 (1997); Murphy, supra note 9, at 289-9
iI. I hope to disprove the claim that "from the standpoint of distributive justice, it would be
simply arbitrary to restrict the application of its notion of fairness to anything short of the entire
transaction." Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1O77, Io86 (1989). I believe
my approach effectively integrates distributive claims with nondistributively motivated limits on legal
liability.
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Remembering that the right to basic income is ultimately held
against other individuals takes the issue outside the boundaries of public
law. Although the United States does not recognize a constitutional right
to adequate income," our private law does and should implicitly
recognize certain imperfect social rights. Imperfect rights shape rights
and responsibilities with respect to individuals against whom an
imperfect-right holder does not otherwise bear a direct claim under
private law. They do not give rise to independent, affirmative claims
between private persons, but they do disallow, or at least discourage
through higher pricing, conduct that would otherwise be permissible.
I will first develop the argument in the context of the contractual
doctrine of unconscionability. The doctrine of unconscionability
concedes that contract rights are not just defeasible upon payment or
change of circumstance but may fail for reasons exogenous to core
contract principles. Under conditions of partial compliance, imperfect
social rights held against the state sometimes negate the force of contract
rights and their correlative contract obligations. Contract claims that
would otherwise succeed, fail, because the transaction at issue exploits
and exacerbates distributive injustice. My aim is both to shed light on the
doctrine of unconscionability and to demonstrate a deeper point about
the relationship between imperfect social rights and private law.
My second example of the destabilizing effect of inequality on
private law is in the realm of mass torts. While causation is an essential
element of tort liability, it has been observed that causation analysis has
been relatively relaxed in the context of mass product liability, as in
litigation pertaining to asbestos, smoking, and high-fat foods. 3 I will
suggest that it is natural and perhaps appropriate that a less rigorous
standard be applied in light of the underlying inequities reflected in the
fact patterns of these cases. While the socioeconomic conditions that may
have caused certain social groups to have been disproportionately
affected by the risky products in question are not on trial, easing the
burden on class action litigants is sometimes a third-best solution where
there is neither background distributive justice nor the political will to
12. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-35 (973); Lindsay v.
,
Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 486-87 (970).
13. See Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass
Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 876 (2005) ("[Tlhe collective plaintiff and the collective
or indeterminate defendant fundamentally challenge the traditional requirement of individualized
causation in tort law."); Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEo. L.J. 137, 138 (1987)
(citing rising egalitarianism and "the absence as yet of a mechanism other than the tort suit to regulate
those activities and secure a measure of compensation for those who may be being victimized by
them" as among the factors fueling the decline of the traditional legal concept of causation); see also

Theodore H. Frank, A Taxonomy of Obesity Litigation, 28 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK L. REv. 427, 435-37
(2006); Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation:Mass Products Torts' Incomplete Incorporationof
Social Welfare Principles,41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 1000-02 (2006).
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compensate victims ex post through direct legislation.'4 Once again, wellentrenched rules of private law give way under the pressure of imperfect
social rights. Distributive injustice expands the scope of the individual's
responsibility for others' losses.
In Part I of this Article I will explain the majority position on the
irrelevance of distributive justice to private law. Scholars of both
corrective justice and legal economics implicitly posit the "privateness"
of private law in opposition to the quintessential "publicness" of
distributive justice. In Part II, I develop the concept of imperfect social
rights. I begin by exploring the general character of imperfect rights,
relating them to the more familiar concept of imperfect duty, and
inquiring whether giving imperfect rights legal force is ever an
appropriate method of enforcing imperfect duties. I conclude that
imperfect rights may be enforceable. I then turn to the specific imperfect
rights generated by distributive justice, distinguishing them from other
derivative duties that individuals may have in furtherance of distributive
justice. I argue that while justice may be the first virtue of social
institutions, some of the rights and obligations of justice, which are not
enforceable as against the state, may be given partial legal effect by
individuals, and against other private persons. In Part III, I argue that the
doctrine of unconscionability may be understood to give effect to
14. Kaplow and Shavell raise, but do not respond to, the argument that redistribution through
legal rules may be a second-best solution where the legislature fails to accomplish redistribution, but
note that it raises questions "about the function of courts in a democracy," and suggest that "it seems
unlikely that courts can accomplish significant redistribution through the legal system without
attracting the attention of legislators." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note I, at 675. The objection that
judges should not pursue ends that the legislature has not specifically endorsed is ironic coming from
legal economists who usually endorse the advancement of efficiency norms by common law reasoning.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (5980); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the

Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (977). Two possible arguments might justify the
application of efficiency but not equity norms. First, one might argue that efficiency is already part of
the positive law for historical reasons. The temptation of this argument likely motivates the descriptive
part of the law and economics project-the claim indirectly supports the accompanying normative
arguments. Second, one might argue that efficiency is apolitical in a way that distribution is not. Both
claims would be false, though I cannot present a full argument to that effect here. See C. Edwin Baker,
The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. &PuB. AFF. 3, 4-8 0975) (critiquing efficiency as a
goal of the legal system). But it is worth noting briefly that if any policies should be implemented by
the courts without an explicit legislative mandate, it may be those with respect to which we expect the
political process to function inadequately because the group disadvantaged by inaction lacks the
power to compel action. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-36 (1980) (arguing that
judicial scrutiny should protect minorities in the political process). Such a process-sensitive approach is
more likely to favor judicial activism in service of distributive justice than of efficiency. Moreover,
some level of redistribution already has been endorsed in public policy. The fact that the legislature
(and the political community at large) cannot agree either on the optimal level of redistribution, or the
best means of redistribution, does not show that there is no agreement on the need for some transfers,
especially in the modest fashion advocated here. Legislative inaction does not demonstrate a
consensus against distribution at the margins.
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imperfect social rights. In Part IV, I contend that the application of
private law doctrine is affected by background inequality, as in the
context of mass torts.
I. How PRIVATE IS PRIVATE LAW?
In arguing that imperfect social rights destabilize rights and
responsibilities otherwise secured by private law, my aim is in part to
highlight one public aspect of private law. But this public aspect is
significant only inasmuch as private law is otherwise generally
understood to be private. Notwithstanding the label, it is not so obvious
in what sense private law is private. One initial observation might be that
litigation in private law is initiated by a private (non-governmental)
person against another private person. But the fact that plaintiff and
defendant are both private persons is arguably just symptomatic of a
deeper privateness in private law. Scholars of private law will differ on
the question of what that thicker notion of privateness consists of.
Scholars of corrective justice might answer that private law
implements bilateral justice and is private in the sense that its principles
derive from the rights and responsibilities of two parties with respect to
one another. The form of those rights and responsibilities do not
importantly depend on a broader social scheme.' 5 Along these lines,
Ernest Weinrib emphasizes that:
[It is a] basic feature of private law[ that] a particular plaintiff sues a
particular defendant. Unjust gain and loss are not mutually
independent changes in the parties' holdings; if they were, the loss and
the gain could be restored by two independent operations. But because
the plaintiff has lost what the defendant has gained, a single liability
links the particular person who gained to the particular person who
lost.'6

On this view, using the plaintiffs and defendants that appear before
the court to advance broader social policies is equally misguided whether
the policies in question are wealth enhancing or wealth redistributing.' 7
15. Notably, scholars of corrective justice generally allow that the content of particular rights and
duties may depend on social and historical context. See WEINRIB, supra note I, at 227-28; Coleman &
Ripstein, supra note 6. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court rejected the prepolitical status of contract in West Coast Hotel. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392
(1937) ("'The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department
of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide
restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community."' (quoting Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911))).
16. WEINRIB, supra note I, at 63. Note that the defendant can be said to have gained from
plaintiff's loss not just where there has been a transfer of tangible property but also where the
defendant has engaged in some activity in which she ought to not have engaged, with a resulting loss
for plaintiff.
17. Cf Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist
Ways of Assessing
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Most other scholars of corrective justice are also committed to the
normative independence of the principles of corrective justice.'8 While
normative independence need not correspond to institutional separation,
because corrective justice principles are manifest in private law, most
corrective justice scholars reject any attempt to enlist private law in the
service of an exogenous principle like distributive justice."0 Private law is
then private in that it does not depend on or appeal to any public policy
subject to political negotiation. However, private law is not as private as
moral law; unlike moral law, it has the essential feature that its positive
content is determined and enforced by the state.
Scholars of law and economics construe the private element of
private law differently. Unlike theorists of corrective justice, legal
economists argue that private law does and should advance public

purposes, and in particular, the relatively neutral goal of aggregate
wealth maximization, which often serves as a proxy for the more
normatively interesting ends of welfare, utility, or even happiness." Thus,

the scope of private rights and obligations are determined with respect to
the interests of others besides those of the plaintiff and defendant on
whose claims and liabilities a given court may pass judgment. Of course,
that has not translated into pursuit of social justice through private law.
Kaplow and Shavell have argued against the pursuit of redistribution

Social Institutions, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 241, 246 (1995) ("Understood as guides to the assessment of

social institutions, contractarianism and consequentialism are for the most part not competitors but
alternative presentations of a single idea: both tend to assess alternative institutional schemes
exclusively by how each would affect its individual human participants.").
18. See, e.g., Perry, supra note I, at 237 ("[Clorrective and distributive justice are conceptually
independent.").
19. To be fair, some corrective justice theorists have developed sophisticated accounts of the
relationship between distributive and corrective justice that do not insist on their independence. See,
e.g., Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 6, at 93 (explaining that "corrective and distributive justice are
connected," not just in the sense that grave distributive injustice delegitimizes the entitlements
protected by corrective justice, but "in another way as well. However distributive shares are to be
fixed, their value will depend, in part, on the tort regime that is in effect."). And other theorists, like
Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick, have embraced the full incorporation of private law into the
machinery with which the state pursues distributive justice. See Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note i.
They argue that "the rules of contract law are ... [designed] in conjunction with the overall scheme, in
a manner that is instrumental to serving the demands of the principles of justice," i.e., as part of an
overall scheme that maximizes the position of the least well-off. Id. at 621-22. While I agree that
private law is not autonomous, my argument here does not go as far in denying the possibility that
private law may be designed primarily to serve ends other than distributive justice, especially in ideal
theory.
2o. E.g., Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 8t N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1967 n.313
(2oo6); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 295 (1986); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, s 4
HARV. L. REV. 961, 997 (20O); Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to PracticalApplication: The Vision of
a Good Society and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 426-27 (2oo6); Hanoch Sheinman, Are

Tradeoffs Between Justice and Welfare Possible? Calabresiand Dworkin on the Normative Foundations
of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 250, 264 (2005).
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through private law because, while redistributive taxation distorts work
incentives, redistributive legal rules are doubly distortionary because
they also distort the level of precaution undertaken in activities governed
by those rules.' Chris Sanchirico has demonstrated that their argument is
not persuasive on its own terms, because "[d]istortions may counteract
one another, and eliminating some of them may exacerbate the negative
impact of those that remain."2 Moreover, welfare transfers may be
possible at the margins around optimal legal rules without any net
welfare loss. 3 Kaplow and Shavell's argument may be gradually losing its
dominance in the economics literature. 4 But even while it stood, Kaplow
and Shavell's argument was not a defense of private law from the
imposition of "public" ends or public interest. To the contrary, Kaplow
and Shavell, like other legal economists, favor the use of private law to
pursue public interests, and do not feel constrained by any independent
normative principles that might be embodied in private law institutions.
Their argument against the pursuit of redistribution in private law is not
an argument about the private nature of private law's ends.
The legal economic approach nevertheless defers to a distinct notion
of privateness and respects private law as the principal space within
which those values reign. Legal economists are generally loathe to
second-guess preferences adopted by individuals, and distrust attempts
by the state to second-guess the market's gauge of those preferences.
Welfare is, after all, normally taken to be the satisfaction of private
preferences; wealth is the means by which individuals pursue the
satisfaction of private preferences. Private law, to a far greater extent
than public law, uses market mechanisms to advance the public interest,
and it does so by harnessing the value of private information. Private law
enables the efficient allocation of resources by setting rules, which are
likely to allocate entitlements to those who value them most. The state
does not independently pass judgment on the relative value of proposed
uses of a given property right; private information, valuations, and beliefs
are king. In fact, were welfare consequentialists not committed to the
priority and privilege of private information and practices-that is, if
they did not take satisfaction of private preferences as the primary or

21. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note i, at 667-68.
22. Sanchirico, supra note i,at 1017.
23. Id. at 1025; see also Ronen Avraham etal., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules
in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1141-44 (2004);
Chris William Sanchirico, Taes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 799 (2000).
24. See Avraham et al., supra note 23, at I152 Sanchirico, supra note 23 at 799-800; see also
Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishinga Case
for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. I, 21-22 (2005); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare
Depends on Fairness:A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 847-50 (2002); JoIls,
supra note i.
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sole determinant of the welfare they seek to promote-they might not
reject redistribution in private law. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir has
recently argued that redistribution through private law is more welfareenhancing than tax-and-transfer because the former "convey[s] a
message as to the things worth having[;] ...assist[s] in forming notions of
entitlement," which are more conducive to self-respect; "enhance[s]
recipients' valuation of the things they have been given"; and faces less
resistance from givers.25 This line of argument is probably anathema to
most legal economists because it seeks to dethrone the satisfaction of
private preferences, including private values, in favor of an ostensibly
objective measure of well-being.
There is another sense in which the legal economic approach to
private law treats the domain of property, contract and tort as private. In
selecting the optimal legal rule, legal economists aggregate expected
welfare or wealth under various possible rules. Only aggregates are
considered, and total welfare or wealth is nothing more or less than the
sum of all private welfare or wealth. Just as the corrective justice
approach focuses on the individual as the agent capable of pre-political
responsibility, legal economists focus on individuals as the relevant unit
of analysis because only individuals form preferences (or so the approach
assumes). In both cases then, matters of distributive justice are naturally
set aside or downplayed because distributive justice is a feature of the
collective 6 But if corrective justice theorists and the liberal tradition of
which they are often a part are sometimes accused of exaggerating the
boundaries between persons, legal economists and the consequentialist
tradition of which they are a part may fail to take seriously the difference
between persons." This criticism is usually leveled at the aggregation
strategy per se, but a certain move in the relevant literature is
particularly telling. Legal economists sometimes set aside distributive
justice for expositional purposes, or because they believe legal rules are
never a good way of advancing distributive justice. But often distributive
justice is set aside because the economic model takes as its typical
economic actor a large firm with numerous, diversified shareholders,
equally interested in the performance of all firms in their respective
portfolios. 8 On this assumption, the real parties in interest in private
25. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 326, 331-32 (2oo6).
26. Of course, legal economists do not set aside distributive questions only in the context of
private law. One might further divide public law into the domain of tax and transfer, on the one hand,
and everything else (with the possible exception of education, which is arguably part of one's initial
distribution of human capital and therefore appropriately treated as something more than just another
market for services), on the other.
27. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 27 (critiquing utilitarianism).
28. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of ContractLaw, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2OO3) ("A diversified owner wants the value of his portfolio to increase, not the

November 2oo8]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

litigation are indistinguishable. 9 The same social group- diversified
shareholders-is interested equally in the performance of plaintiff and
defendant.3 ° Thus, there is no important distributive question at stake in
private law disputes. If one further assumes that all citizens belong to this
group of diversified shareholders and that individuals have no economic
interests other than those related to their shareholder status, then
matters of distributive justice move still further out into the horizon. If
distributive justice is quintessentially public, in that it invokes obligations
related to one's membership in a political community, removing the
messiness, not just of distributive justice, but also of distribution from
private law, indeed leaves a distinctly private sphere.
Furthermore, just as the bilateral character and/or normative
independence of corrective justice is taken to justify an indifference to
matters of distributive justice in private law, legal economists' deference
to private valuation too entails a willingness to set aside matters of
distributive justice within the confines of private law. A private person's
valuation of a given property entitlement depends on her existing
entitlements, and therefore, on the background distribution of
entitlements. Thus, in taking existing preferences and valuations as one's
starting point, one already sets aside some (but not all) distributive
questions.
From a utilitarian standpoint, one might characterize the economic
approach as an attempt to make the best of this world, but not all worlds.
Given a state of the world (including a particular distribution of existing
entitlements and preferences), legal economists usually maximize wealth
as a rough and reasonable proxy for welfare.3 From a deontological
standpoint, however, the setting aside of distributive questions is
problematic. If background social distributions are contested, the
valuations of private persons are arguably not self-justifying, i.e., the
state does not have reason to facilitate the creation or materialization of
that value. The strong (illiberal) claim would be that, where background
distribution is contested, private preferences, standing alone, do not
value of particular firms in his portfolio at the expense of other firms in his portfolio."); see also Ethan
J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24
QtINNIPIAc L. REv 1,3-4 (2005) (noting that Schwartz and Scott's express assumption about the

character of contracting parties is typical of efficiency theories of contract).
29. See Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1350 (2006)

("Whereas contracts, intuitively understood, involve coordination among multiple parties, the
transactions addressed by Schwartz and Scott's economic theory ultimately involve only one."
(emphasis omitted)). Note that the collapsing of multiple parties into one does not parallel the
homogenization of all parties in Rawls' original position. In the original position, parties appear but
are not actually identical; stripping them of their particularities is a way of thinking about distributive
justice among persons who are in fact different. In the single shareholder model, by contrast, the
heterogeneity is apparent and the identity of interests is real.
30. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28, at 556.
31. See sources cited supra note 20.
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properly motivate state action at all. The weaker claim would be that the
state cannot easily adopt or aggregate private preferences where those
preferences are the product of unjust market conditions. The state (i.e.,
courts) can defer to private valuation of assets completely only where the
background distribution is not at issue.
Of course, one might conclude that it is morally problematic to
maximize wealth through private law in a distributively flawed
environment32 and still agree that distribution is properly outside the
sphere of private law. That is, after all, the position of those committed
to the corrective justice view. On the status of distributive justice in
private law-namely, its irrelevance-most scholars of corrective justice
and legal economics are in apparent agreement.
II.

IMPERFECT SOCIAL RIGHTS

The concept of imperfect social rights sheds new light on the
intractable problem that distributive injustice poses for private law. An
important obstacle has been that the systemic difficulties raised by
distributive injustice, even if acknowledged as relevant, do not easily
translate into common law rules that govern transactions between
persons. The first obstacle has been the unfairness and inefficiency
inherent in placing the burden of distributive justice disproportionately
on those who happen to be defendants in private litigation, and the
related undesirability of conferring a windfall on certain plaintiffs as
compared to other similarly situated individuals.
A related pragmatic problem has been that, while statutory
interventions in contract law are frequently distributively motivated, it is
not at all clear which general rules of contract law consistently
disadvantage the socially disadvantaged. To reform particular rules, one
would have to make questionable empirical assumptions, such as, who
usually has information that they do not want to disclose (but could be
required to disclose), or who is more likely to act in substantial reliance
on a promise made in the absence of consideration.33 The most apparent
alternative to framing rules that have a favorable distributive effect is to
apply rules with distributive ends in sight. But any distributively
motivated intervention in a particular case appears not only ad hoc, but

32. Most corrective justice theorists would oppose the maximization of wealth through private
law irrespective of whether distributive justice obtains, since they view the space occupied entirely by
independent principles of corrective justice.
33. However, where legal rules are known to affect different classes of individuals differently,
they may be effective tools in the pursuit of distributive justice. See Sanchirico, supra note 23, at 805;
see also Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective
Justice, 92 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1307 (2006) (arguing that though the rules "need [not] be constructed so
as to directly pattern the principles of justice, all of the rules of the legal and political scheme are
nevertheless distributive in nature").
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also unfair. Why should a particular plaintiff or defendant bear the
burden of promoting distributive justice? Even for those who would not
believe the individual party is entitled to a justification for liability that
implicates her individual (as opposed to collective) responsibilities, it
seems grossly inefficient to take distributive considerations into account
where there are superior macro measures that could achieve the same
distributive ends.34 If the perceived absence of individual responsibility
does not prohibit the pursuit of distributive ends in private law, that
absence may leave the pursuit unmotivated.
In what follows I attempt to set forth a way of thinking about
distributive justice that situates it within the relationship between the
individual parties involved in a private action. My goal is to make sense
of the implications of a systemic problem like distributive injustice for
two private litigants. Rather than abandon the linchpin of responsibility,
I aim to show how distributive injustice can condition individual
responsibility. The concept of imperfect social rights helps explain why
the distributively advantaged exploiter is and should be legally
responsible for her exploitation of the distributively disadvantaged, even
though identical conduct between parties differently situated in the social
order would not be recognized as exploitation, or at least, would not be
recognized as such in private law.
I will begin by exploring the general character of imperfect rights,
relating them to the more familiar concept of imperfect duty. Of
particular interest is whether imperfect duties are enforceable, and
whether giving imperfect rights legal force is ever an appropriate method
of enforcement. 5 I then turn to the specific imperfect rights generated by
distributive justice, and argue that while justice may be the first virtue of
social institutions, some of the rights and obligations of justice that are
not enforceable against the state may be given partial legal effect by
individuals against other private persons. While social rights are positive
rights, due to their imperfect status, they take familiar legal form as
negative perfect rights against conduct that exploits and exacerbates
background distributive injustice. 36
In the discussion that follows, I refer both to Kant's conception of
justice in relation to property, as well as Rawls' theory of justice. Given
that my argument relies in part on a rejection of Kant's rather
constrained understanding of the state's obligations toward the poor, I
should explain why I do not rest my account entirely on Rawls'
compelling account of distributive justice. While Rawls and other neo-

34. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note I, at 676-77.

35. Cf. Cohen, supra note Io, at 3 (arguing that "principles of distributive justice" apply "to
people's legally unconstrained choices").
36. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-72 (1969).
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Kantians may better characterize our social obligations than does Kant,
the very virtues of Rawls' approach that make it so compelling also make
it difficult to articulate the rights and obligations of citizens under
conditions of partial compliance by the state. The force of the
conclusions drawn from the original position derives in no small part
from the fact that the parties to it are unaware of their actual social
positions, and the fact that the principles they generate are to govern
society as a whole.37 Rawlsian justice is complete, and citizens in Rawls'
hypothetical just society support the laws necessary to support just
institutions. 8 Rawls makes few concessions to reality.39 The refusal to
take existing conditions of inequality as a starting point is necessary to
endow the sweeping conclusions of his thought experiment with their
moral force. But it also makes it difficult to use his heuristic to identify
rights and obligations under partial compliance. Rawls takes so seriously
the requirements of background justice that it is difficult to know how to
act against any other backdrop.
Kant's framework is more conducive to nonideal theory. As
discussed further below, Kant too engages in a thought experiment,
though his is the more conventional one regarding the transition from a
state of nature to civil society. For reasons discussed below, Kant
believes the transition secures property rights that were only provisional
before the establishment of a state.'0 While he places some limits on the
scope of those rights, by and large they reflect the holdings of persons
prior to the transition. Of course, Kant would not characterize this move
37. RAWLS, supranote 7, at i 1-3, i8-I9.

38. Id. at 454 (arguing that members of a well-ordered society with just institutions "acquire the
corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them"); id. at 567-68
(assuming that a member of a well-ordered society knows that "institutions are just and that other
have (and will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to his, and therefore that they comply (and
will continue to comply) with these arrangements," making it rational for him to affirm his own sense
of justice).
39. See George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 428 (1987) ("Rawls' principles of

justice and the methodology of the original position are explicitly limited to working out the basic
framework of social cooperation. The perturbations that constitute the stuff of legal controversy
belong to the field of 'partial compliance,' a field of justice that Rawls, for good reason, excludes."
(quoting RAWLS, supra note 7, at 35)); Murphy, supra note 9, at 282-83 ("[I]t is not an accident that
Rawls is committed to both the primacy of the basic structure as the subject of justice and the primacy
of ideal theory; the two positions are mutually supporting."). Of course, Rawls is not oblivious to the
facts driving inequality. He takes moderate natural inequalities as among the circumstances of justice
and recognizes the limits of altruism and the realities of personal motivation. RAwLs, supra note 7, at
127. These premises underlie the principle that inequality may be justified where it is necessary to
improve the position of the worst off. His principles of justice are intended to be applied to existing
societies. Furthermore, the process of reflective equilibrium takes existing normative intuitions as a
starting point, and those intuitions may be expected to reflect some tolerance for existing conditions.
Id. at 48. Nevertheless, perhaps because the parties to the original position are unaware of their
individual holdings, they do not take the existing distribution as normatively significant; nor does
Rawls consider moral reasons to do so.
40. IMMANUEL KANT, THE ME-rAPHYSICS OF MORALS 78 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
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as a concession to reality, but in effect, he takes as his starting point what
we too must take as ours in attempting to do anything less than rewrite
the basic structure of our society. In fact, Kant's reasons for deferring to
initial inequality parallel our own; a universal right to appropriate, paired
with a universal duty to respect the resulting property claims, facilitates
social cooperation, and thus individual freedom.'
Kant's recognition of property rights is a compromise of sorts that
serves a further end, just as today we defer to property entitlements
largely because they are the foundation of a system that appears to
provide a level of security, stability, and prosperity-all essential to
human flourishing-that no other system has delivered.42 Because Kant,
like us, thinks about our obligations to the poor against the backdrop of
unequal holdings, I hope that studying his views will give us more
traction on the question of imperfect rights under conditions of imperfect
justice than we have had in reliance on the concededly more compelling
and holistic account of justice developed by Rawls.

A.

THE NATURE OF IMPERFECT RIGHTS

In this section, I will describe imperfect rights and argue that such
rights may be enforced. Enforceability turns on the content of a right or
duty rather than on its form. Imperfect rights are best understood as
rights of a particular form. Specifically, they are not held against any
single person, and when violated, they do not ground a claim for any
particular quantum of redress. As rights of a certain form, imperfect
rights are in principle enforceable, in that they are not unenforceable.
Rights and duties that effectuate a just social scheme are affirmatively
enforceable; I will call them "political" as opposed to "private" rights.
Thus, imperfect rights whose content stems from concerns of distributive
justice, or imperfect social rights, should be enforced.
Because imperfect rights are common, but not commonly discussed,
one might resist the argument at this level of generality. More familiar
than the concept of an imperfect right is the concept of an imperfect
duty. The classic imperfect duty may be the duty of self-perfection.43
While human beings have a duty to themselves to cultivate their

41. See KANT, supra note 40, at 52. But see Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 559, 573 (1987) ("In Kant's view, the significance of the intelligible relation is that it is
the first way in which practical reason can express the most fundamental postulate of the entire realm
of freedom: the difference between a rationally free being or 'moral personality'-which must always
be recognized as an end in itself-and external things-which can simply be used." (quoting IMMANUEL
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 223 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965))).
42. Cf JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 350-54 (2002) (arguing that there are good reasons to
support a system of private property rights that is not ideal and defending "second best" entitlements);
Perry, supra note I, at 26o, 262 ("[Coleman] maintains in particular the importance of property rights
to sustaining markets, since markets contribute to overall social welfare in well-known ways.
43. KANT, supra note 4o, at 194-95.
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capacities and be a "useful member of the world," Kant describes this as
but a "wide and imperfect duty[,] for while it does contain a law for the
maxim of actions, it determines nothing about the kind and extent of
actions themselves but allows a latitude for free choice."' In other words,
our duty to ourselves to cultivate our capacities is indeterminate with
respect to specific actions. For example, it does not dictate which books
we should read, or whether to pursue painting or the saxophone.
Kant defined imperfect duties more generally as those which
"prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves," or those
which "leave[] a playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following
(complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in
what way one is to act and how much one is to do."45 The discretion
created (or left open) by imperfect duties is not as great as it appears on
its face because only certain reasons permit acting for some other end
than that specified by the imperfect duty, namely those ends which we
are also duty bound to promote. For example, we may fail to do some
good for our neighbor only because we choose instead to do some good
for our parents; the implication is that one may not except oneself from
the imperfect duty in a given situation for no reason at all.
Kant explicitly links the "wide" aspect of certain duties with their
"imperfectness." He states:
The wider the duty.., the more imperfect is a man's obligation to
action; as he, nevertheless, brings closer to narrow duty (duties of
right) the maxim of complying with wide duty (in his disposition), so
much the more perfect is his virtuous action.
Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only duties of virtue. 6

Thus, in Kant's view, imperfect duties are wide duties, and wide duties
(unlike narrow duties of right) are unenforceable.
It is not clear, however, why an imperfect duty, or that which names
a necessary end but fails to command or forbid particular actions, is
always unenforceable. A "wide" duty could be wide in the sense that it
opens up (i.e., widens) the field in which virtue can be practiced, and
therefore corresponds to unenforceable duties. But a duty could also be
"wide" in form, in the more literal sense, in that its prescriptions are
open ended; in the text above, Kant seems to be using the word in this
sense.47 The two senses of "wide" need not overlap entirely. One can
imagine duties which should remain unenforceable, and compliance with
which should mark out the virtuous, but which nevertheless prescribe
behavior quite precisely. One's duty to keep a promise to have dinner
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 153.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.

November 2008]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

with a friend is an example of a duty which should not be enforceable,
but which is nevertheless perfect. The perfect form of the duty does not
imply that it should be enforced. Enforceability does not turn on form.
It is neither logically nor morally necessary that duties with
indeterminate prescriptive content should remain unenforceable. It is
certainly not logically necessary, in that a court or other state authority
could be vested with the authority to coerce compliance with imperfect
duties in accordance with its own judgment as to what actions should be
taken to advance the end specified by the imperfect duty. 48 This type of
coercion is familiar and pervasive in any system of tax and transfer,
where the legislative and executive branches set the means by which we
collectively pursue morally necessary ends.
Nor is it morally necessary that imperfect duties remain
unenforceable in the judicial sphere. Courts are empowered to enforce
perfect rights and duties in individual cases notwithstanding their formal
indeterminacy in particular cases.49 That is, a court may impose liability
on a particular defendant on a particular set of facts, even though the
formal principle of right governing the case may be indeterminate at that
level of particularity. The state nevertheless may exercise its coercive
powers to apply the formal rule because (i) state resolution of conflicts
arising from alleged violations of private right is necessary, in that
resolution in the absence of legitimate political authority necessarily falls
short of justice; and (2) while the forms governing private law may be
dictated by practical reason, they do not allow deduction of specific rules
adequate to resolve individual disputes. Thus, states, through courts,
must fill in the indeterminacy that arises in the vindication of even
perfect rights.
It thus appears that a state may impose burdens or coerce citizens
even in the absence of a moral rule that specifically authorizes a
particular coercive act. If indeterminacy at the level of individual cases
can be handled, why should indeterminacy at a broader-or wider-level
preclude state enforcement of an imperfect duty? Kant does seem to take
that position, but it is not clear that this is motivated by anything other
than the general notion that human beings cultivate virtue in the field of
48. In the context of imperfect social duties, the idea would not be to actually coerce individuals

to adopt distributive ends as their own, but to coerce or restrict actions in a manner that the state
concludes will advance distributive ends. Thus, the idea of enforcing imperfect duties is not
conceptually incoherent in the way that attempting to force individuals to voluntarily promote

distributive justice would be. Cf Mary J. Gregor, Kant's Theory of Property,4 REV. METAPMYSICS 757,
768 (1988) ("Another can indeed coerce me to perform actions that are means only to his end, but not
to make his end my own.").
49. While rules designed to maximize efficiency are also indeterminate in practice, given limits to
the information available to courts, I make this point with respect to formal rules of abstract right
because those prepared to accept economic justifications for the rules of private law are not likely to
be concerned about the formal question of whether imperfect duties are ever enforceable.
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imperfect duty, and that constricting this field unduly constricts the scope
of our moral agency. 0 We can remain committed to preserving the
possibility of virtuous action, however, and still conclude that some
imperfect duties are enforceable.
Just as some but not all perfect duties are enforceable, some but not
all imperfect duties may be enforceable. The concern to preserve a
sphere for legally unregulated moral action is better served by drawing
the boundaries of enforceability based on the content of the rights and
duties proposed for enforcement, rather than on their form. This is not
the place to attempt to expound a theory regarding which rights should
be enforceable as a general matter. It is enough for my purposes that
rights necessary to effectuate political justice are among those which
should be enforced, i.e., be given coercive effect. Whatever the boundary
between political and truly private moral rights, rights intended to treat
the basic structure of society are surely political.
From another angle, one might be tempted to conclude that Kant is
not averse to coercive state enforcement of some imperfect duties. After
all, Kant does recognize an enforceable duty to support the needy.' In
his account of the transition to civil society in the Philosophy of Right,52
Kant concludes that the securing of property rights by itself would
violate justice if it were to obligate individuals to respect others'
(formerly only provisional) property rights without guaranteeing a basic
income in return.53 This move is reminiscent of the impulse toward
reciprocity that underlies many liberal contractarian accounts, though
the requirement of reciprocity is not as robust in Kant as it is with his
contemporary followers like Rawls. Nevertheless, even Kant recognizes a
duty to provide for the poor on which the very legitimacy of the state
rests. 4 Notably, he further recognizes that the state may coerce property
owners to pay for the support to which the poor are entitled.5 On its
face, a duty to provide for the poor smacks of imperfect duty-it does
not appear to dictate precisely how much is owed, nor, as a practical
matter, exactly who is entitled to support.

50. See KANT, supra note 40, at 155.
51. Id. at ioi ("[T]he government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the

means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs.
The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since they owe their existence to an
act of submitting to its protection and care, which they need in order to live; on this obligation the
state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens." (footnote
omitted)).
52. Id. at 1-138.
53. For a more detailed discussion of Kant's account of the transition to civil society and how it
illuminates the notion of imperfect social rights, see infra Part II.C.
54. See supra note 51.
55. See KANrr, supra note 40, at tot.
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Kant does not, however, characterize this duty as an imperfect duty.
Perhaps it may be treated formally as a perfect duty because the
obligation is only to support bare subsistence (if that is all that is
necessary to render a person independent), and so the precise level of
support required is conceivably determinable. But today we are unlikely
to consider the duty to provide a basic income as determined by literal
necessity. Rather, as in the Rawlsian scheme, the duty is likely to be
relative to others' income and wealth. The obligatory level of support
likely further depends on the costs of distributive measures, at least
inasmuch as it affects the absolute level of basic resources that the worstoff group possesses. Given the myriad uncertainties that plague the
application of a distributive principle, even a morally necessary one, it is
hard to imagine that the duty of support is perfect in form. It is unlikely
to identify either its correlative right holders (or, at least, beneficiaries)
or even a rule that identifies the level of support, as opposed to a
decision rule for selecting the level of support. Thus, even if Kant would
not have characterized the enforceable duty to support the poor as an
imperfect duty, the contemporary version of that principle takes the form
of an imperfect duty. Moreover, while Kant would not have
characterized it thus, the imperfect duty on the part of those who are
well-off corresponds to an imperfect right held by those who stand to
benefit from the fulfillment of the imperfect duty.
The argument thus far implies that imperfect duties may be
enforceable, and the duty to provide for the poor is a familiar example.
But having taken "enforceable" to mean just that performance of the
duty can be exacted by force, it does not yet follow that the
corresponding imperfect rights can ever be enforceable by the rights
holder. Again, while Kant recognized the duty to support the poor as
subject to coercive enforcement by the state, he did not characterize that
duty as imperfect. Moreover, in his scheme, the duty is owed to the state
rather than to poor citizens directly,16 and the authority of the state to
enforce rights it bears as conditions of its own legitimacy may not reflect
on the enforceability of imperfect rights by individuals. The question is
whether an imperfect right held by individuals can ever be a true or full
"right" in the sense of authorizing coercion by the rights bearer.
Does the fact that imperfect duty holders may be subject to coercive
enforcement itself imply a right on the part of rights holders to enforce
their rights directly? It does not. Imperfect duties may be subject to
enforcement by the state, which is entitled to resolve the indeterminacy of
the moral space created by imperfect duties, just as it resolves the
narrower space inevitably left by the application of formal moral and
56. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78
REV. 795,817-I8 (2003).

NOTRE DAME
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legal rules in particular cases. The argument for the enforceability of
imperfect duties applies only to the state, not to rights holders directly. In
fact, the very analogy between the indeterminacy of enforcing imperfect
duties and the indeterminacy in all enforcement of rules shows that
individuals are not entitled to direct enforcement. The indeterminacy of
the application of the law of right is one of the reasons that a state is
necessary to justly resolve disputes arising from violations of right.
Individuals cannot apply those rules, because the relationship of power
between them, rather than the rule of reason which motivates the law,
will inevitably color the discernment and application of the law of right.
Thus, even perfect duties, with their correlative perfect rights, are not
usually subject to coercive enforcement by right holders directly. Rather,
in the normal case, the state is a necessary intermediary. 7 This suggests
that imperfect-right holders may not directly enforce their rights, but the
state might act as an intermediary in the enforcement of imperfect rights.
While one could go further and leave the imperfect-rights holder out
of the enforcement picture altogether by consigning imperfect rights to
public law, it would be peculiar to leave the holders of imperfect rights
without any role at all in the enforcement of those rights. After all,
inasmuch as private litigants may initiate suit, our system of private law
assigns the holders of perfect rights a substantial role in the enforcement
of those rights. Without that role, whatever the authority to enforce
certain duties, most violations of right would go unaddressed. But even
apart from the practical point that the absence of a role for rights holders
may vitiate their rights, there is also the principled case to be made that
in linking rights bearer to duty bearer, the law expresses the correlativity
of rights and duties. How can the law express this correlativity with
respect to imperfect rights and duties? 5 A precise matching of imperfect
right and imperfect duty is practically impossible because, by definition,
it is unknown exactly who owes whom what. Arguably, public discourse
is capable of linking those who owe to those who are owed. But private
law in one sense is an institutional statement of dissatisfaction with solely
discursive methods of linking duty holders to rights bearers. The next
section suggests how we might harness the correlative structure of

57. The exceptional cases are ones where the state cannot function as an effective intermediary,
as in the case of self-defense. But exceptional instances of justified self-help may exist with respect to
imperfect social rights as well, as in cases of necessity.
58. Arthur Ripstein acknowledges that "[ilf private holdings are inconsistent with justice, there
are bound to be misgivings about treating those holdings as enforceable," but raises
doubt [as to] whether any particular person can rightly appeal to the overall structure of
society as a whole in response to a tort action, if only because those who are in the best
position to raise such an issue will be the very people who are too poor to be sued anyway.
Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. I8I1, 1843
(2004). Weinrib is similarly concerned that introducing distributive justice concerns fails to adequately
link the wrong at issue with the defendant asked to redress it. See WEINRIB,supra note i,at 79.

November 2008]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

125

private law to give expression to the correlativity of imperfect rights and
duties. It is possible to relate imperfect duty to imperfect right within
private law, notwithstanding the multiplicity of duty and right bearers.
B.

THE JUSTICIABLE FORM OF IMPERFECT RIGHTS

Bare numerosity on either side of the equation is not an
insurmountable barrier to incorporating a role for rights holders in the
enforcement of imperfect rights and duties. While the complete set of
duty and right bearers may not be known, it may still be the case that
certain individuals owe more than others, or have special obligations, and
those individuals may be identifiable. Similarly, while it may be unclear
exactly who is being wronged (i.e., the entire set of wronged persons is
not specified), it may nevertheless be clear that certain individuals are
being wronged.
Nor is it impossible to link particular individuals, even though their
rights and duties are generalizable. If there are types of interactions, with
identifiable properties, which are contingent upon and exacerbate the
injustice resulting from a violation of imperfect rights and duties, we may
identify a subset of duty and rights holders by virtue of their participation
in those types of transactions. Participation in the transaction is not a
morally arbitrary proxy for one's status as advantaged or disadvantaged.59
Rather, participation in the transaction is voluntary conduct, the moral
significance of which may hinge on the parties' social status. Thus, those
whose livelihoods are more directly bound up with the poverty of the
poor may have special distributive obligations. On a weak interpretation
of their obligations, we might say that they are at greater risk than others
in their society of violating a universal negative duty to refrain from
exploitation of distributive injustice. But we might also say that the
weight of distributive injustice will sometimes fall more heavily on them
because they assume this risk, i.e., they choose to operate under the
direct shadow of distributive injustice. For while all citizens' wealth
derives in part from the reciprocal cooperation of the socially
disadvantaged, some are situated such that their prosperity is more
directly linked with, or perhaps dependent on, the poverty of the poor. If
our obligations to the poor can be understood as among the conditions
for social cooperation, the obligations to the disadvantaged are thicker
for those who seek a thicker level of cooperation through direct,
profitable exchange with them.
We need not go so far as to hold individuals liable merely for
stepping into the mess created by all. Rather, limited legal responsibility
for collective imperfect duties should arise where a transaction is
59. Cf. Kronman, supra note i, at 502-03 (taking as a necessary evil the discriminatory effects of
contractual regulation (some parties disproportionately bearing the burden of redistribution)).
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contingent on a broader failure to meet imperfect obligations and
exacerbates that collective failure. It would be unfair for a particular
defendant to bear the burden of raising a particular plaintiff to that
socioeconomic status she would occupy in a just social order. But it is not
unfair or arbitrary to disallow a defendant from benefiting from either
his unjust advantages or his transactional partner's unjust disadvantages
in order to further expand his advantage over her. It is one thing to say
that one in a group of thieves should restore all that the group has stolen;
it is another thing to maintain that the most audacious thief should retain
his extra winnings because his colleagues have not been apprehended.
It may seem that the intrinsic unfairness of exploitation does all the
work in this account, but conduct can only be characterized as exploitive
in the legally relevant sense because it violates some right-and that is
how an imperfect right alters the legal character of a given transaction
notwithstanding the general indeterminacy of the right. One could
imagine a characterization of certain behavior as exploitive because it
extracts gain from the violation of some right unrelated to distributive
justice. For example, it could be exploitive to take advantage of another's
suffering. But in that case, one would have to identify the nature and
source of the right not to have one's suffering taken advantage of. If that
right should not be enforced, the right cannot render legally
consequential the exploitation of a violation of that right. My claim is
that it is exploitive in the legally relevant sense to take advantage of an
injustice-not misfortune-that another has suffered, at least where one
is a party to the injustice. The very same rights which enable us to name
the injustice allow us to label conduct which feeds off that injustice as
exploitive in a special sense. Furthermore, if the injustice is of a political
character (and the notion of injustice may imply this), then just as the
state may rectify the injustice directly, where possible, it may enlist
judicial resources to rectify exploitation of the injustice. There may be
many types of exploitation unrelated to distributive injustice, and
imperfect social rights would not help us decide the legal effect of those
types of exploitation.
The crux of my claim is this: an individual can be responsible for
another's loss in the legally relevant sense just because of background
distributive injustice. It is morally irresponsible to exploit another's
disadvantageous circumstances where your own moral wrong created
those circumstances; in this case, the exploitation is a compounding of a
moral wrong. Likewise, one is legally responsible for the exploitation of
another's disadvantageous circumstances where a legal wrong (i.e., a
wrong which can be coercively remedied) created those circumstances;
the exploitation is a second legal wrong. The initial legal wrong may be a
direct injury. For example, if I poke a hole in my neighbor's tire, my
charging an exorbitant fee to replace it will give rise to a separate legal

November 2008]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

claim. But the background legal claim may also be an imperfect one. If
the circumstances of exploitation are the result of both the exploiter's
failure to fulfill enforceable imperfect duties and a violation of the
victim's imperfect rights, the exploitation is a second legal wrong.
The relevance of the background right is apparent when one
considers the case of someone who exploits knowledge of another's
secret, which is not in itself shameful, but will nevertheless do damage to
the victim if revealed. Our judgment about a threat to reveal the secret
may vary considerably depending on whether the exploiter of the secret
has a valid claim against the exploited. We would not condemn an
employee who exploits knowledge of widespread abuse of employee
rights to extract a holiday bonus that had been previously promised by
her employer. But we might condemn her if she uses that information to
extract payment greater than that promised by her employer. Likewise,
the employee's situation will turn on whether the employee is obligated
(to others) to reveal the employer's secret, or whether the employee is
obligated to keep the secret (e.g., a trade secret). The bare fact that one
takes advantage of a condition reveals little about the moral character of
the action, let alone whether the law should prohibit such exploitation.
Exploitation of a circumstance or characteristic of a person is
generally more wrong to the extent one is responsible for that
circumstance or characteristic, and less wrong to the extent the exploited
party is herself responsible for the disadvantage. Thus, to exploit
someone's vanity or avarice is not so bad, unless perhaps one has stoked
that vanity or avarice through flattery or provocative tales about others'
luxury. To exploit someone's circumstances brought about through
natural disaster is bad only inasmuch as we have a background duty to
alleviate those circumstances. Thus, a taxi driver might exploit flooding
of the rail lines that leaves commuters in safety, but temporarily
stranded; but he may not exploit one who needs to flee some imminent
danger.
Importantly, it is not responsibility for the background condition per
se, which any given exploiter shares with numerous third parties, which
justifies prohibiting exploitation of a condition. Moral responsibility for a
background condition may not always justify legal liability for its
exploitation even where that moral responsibility is unique. For example,
whether saving a stranded person for a significant sum is exploitive
depends on whether there was a duty to save the stranded person at a
lower cost. But because in many cases there is a moral but not a legal
duty, moral and legal exploitation diverge. Whether the exploiter's
conduct amounts to legal exploitation depends on how we characterize
her background duty. In the rescue case, it turns on whether the wouldbe rescuer had not just a moral, but a legal, duty to rescue.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o: 10 5

While the degree of moral responsibility on the part of an exploiter
for the circumstance or characteristic that she exploits may dictate how
we judge her conduct, it does not determine whether the exploitive
conduct is legally prohibited. Whether a form of exploitation is legally
prohibited further depends on whether the condition being exploited
results from violation of an essentially private moral duty/right, or
instead a duty/right with public or political dimensions adequate to
justify coercive enforcement.
Exploitation of a condition should be prohibited to the extent that
the right or duty to correct the condition is itself subject to coercive
enforcement. As argued in the previous section, imperfect social rights
and duties are subject to coercive enforcement."' Even if they are not
directly actionable, their eligibility for coercive enforcement in principle
renders exploitation of distributive injustice a separate legal wrong that is
enforceable in private law. That is why it was important to show that
imperfect rights can be enforceable notwithstanding their form, and in
particular, that social rights are enforceable political rights, not
unenforceable private ones.
One might object that it is misleading to compare exploitation of a
stranded driver by the person who damaged the driver's tires to
exploitation of a more general condition that the exploiter, together with
others, had a duty to correct. There are differences of course. Poking a
hole in someone's tire is actionable in itself; failing to remedy distributive
injustice generates no similar freestanding claim. We might not usually
bother to even label the charging of a high price to the stranded driver as
exploitive; the exploitation is overshadowed by the earlier injury. But
bad conduct does not become benign just because it was preceded by still
worse behavior. Whether the right initially violated was perfect or
imperfect, the initial wrong frames the moral and legal upshot of
subsequent conduct.
This argument is consistent with how we think about exploitation.
Numerous theorists-under varying labels-have distinguished between
exploitation of circumstances as one finds them, and exploitation of
circumstances created by one's own rights violation. Alan Wertheimer, in
his well-developed theory of exploitation, observes that "the fact that an
agreement arises out of unfair background conditions is not, in itself" a
reason "to justify not permitting A to exploit B."'" Joel Feinberg allows
6o. See supra Part II.A.
6I. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION

298 (1996). But Wertheimer also says that:
[l]n virtually all societies, relatively just and relatively unjust, citizens will find themselves in
situations in which they can strike agreements that will produce mutual gains. The parties to
such transactions may understand that even though some fare less well than others by the
appropriate principles of social justice, it is unreasonable to expect the better-off party to
repair those background conditions by adjusting the terms of a particular transaction.
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for a broad notion of exploitation, on which most exploiters are
opportunists who "extract advantage from situations that are not of their
own making," but he separates out "coercers" who "are typically makers
rather than mere discoverers and users of opportunities. 6 ' Feinberg
maintains that consent is "valid" where an offer exploits another's
misfortune, but the offeror did not create that misfortune.6 ' He follows
the distinction of David Zimmerman, who argues that only where the
offeror has created the Hobbesian choice completed by his offer is the
offer coercive." Similarly, Jeffrie Murphy has characterized duress as the
situation where a person consents to another's
proposal only because he
6s
is suffering wrongful treatment from her.
Robert Nozick, too, implicitly relies on this distinction in separating
threats from offers. He suggests that:
[W]hether someone makes a threat against Q's doing an action or an
offer to Q to do the action depends on how the consequence he says he
will bring about changes the consequences of Q's action from what
they would
have been in the normal or natural or expected course of
66
events.

Of course, much depends on what is expected; the term shifts between
"the predicted and the morally required," but the morally required takes
precedence where it is the course preferred by the victim. While the
discussion of threats and offers studies parties at the moment prior to
possible exploitation, it parallels how we should separate the resulting
transactions. Those whose offers turn on their failure to fulfill moral
duties are actually making threats. Those whose offers improve the
other's situation as compared to the moral baseline may be regarded as
noncoercive offerors. The notion is deep-seated that either the label
exploitation or the consequences of exploitation turn on the exploiter's
background obligations with respect to the circumstances of exploitation.
To be sure, background conditions of distributive injustice, unlike
the blown tire, have been brought about by a collective, and not just the
exploiter. But legal liability has never been limited to conduct which
Id. at 234. This is because "even when B's suffering is rooted in social injustice, it may (reasonably) be
treated as a misfortune by A, if A bears no special responsibility for causing or alleviating B's
suffering." Id. at 298. The role of imperfect social rights in my argument is to show that A is
responsible for B's misfortune, and that this responsibility is legally relevant because it stems from
imperfect social duties, which are properly subject to legal enforcement.
62. 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 184
(1988).
63. 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 244 (1986).
64. See id.; David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 1O PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 133 (981)
("[F]or P's offer to be genuinely coercive it must be the case that he actively prevents Q from being in
the alternative pre-proposal situation Q strongly prefers.").

65. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 81 (1981).
66. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440, 447 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
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renders a person exclusively or exhaustively responsible for resulting
losses. Our intuitions regarding responsibility are wider than norms of
legal liability. The fact of multiple responsibility does not handicap the
assignment of legal liability any more than the prevalence of multiple
causation confuses our assignment of personal responsibility. It is enough
for legal liability that the challenged conduct reveals some choice, some
agency, on account of which we can label the person responsible.
Exploitation of injustice implicates this requisite type of responsibility,
because it "does not refer simply to the distributive results of a
transaction, but to the fact that the exploiting agent (singular or plural)
had available an alternative course of action."
Thus, we may impose liability with respect to transactions (voluntary
or involuntary) that are conditioned by a violation of imperfect rights
where the exchange reinforces that violation. Individuals may not control
the collective failure to fulfill imperfect duties, but they do control a
range of events that take place because of, and in furtherance of, the
unjust condition. That individual responsibility links particular
defendants to particular plaintiffs within a broader scheme of imperfect
duty and right. 68 On this approach, although the moral right to
distributive justice is positive, its imperfect status vis-A-vis other
individuals is expressed in its legal form as a negative right against
conduct that exploits and exacerbates distributive injustice. Although
this negative right is perfect, it is derivative from an imperfect positive
right, not some other possible perfect negative right, such as a right
against exploitation more generally.
Legally recognizing the special obligations of certain imperfect dutyholders in private law does not have to take the form of an independent
cause of action for violation of the imperfect right. Rather, an imperfect
right that has gone unfulfilled operates in the manner of an excuse. It
does not categorically excuse one from liability (nor will imperfect duty
alone render anyone liable). It will not deny the normal force of the
obligations that are sometimes excused. But it69will render some generally
sound legal rules inapplicable in certain cases.
Nothing in the argument above shows that imperfect duties or rights
must take this legal form. My objective has been only to show that they

67. David Miller, Exploitation in the Market, in MODERN THEORIES OF EXPLOITATION 149, 161
(Andrew Reeve ed., 1987).
68. See Stephen R. Perry, The Distribution Turn: Mischief Misfortune and Tort Law, 16
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 315, 330-31 (1996) ("What we are looking for is a conception of responsibility that
will tie persons to (certain) harms they cause others.... Responsibility premised on control ... gives
us what up to this point we have been missing: a normative connection between actor and outcome.").
69. See George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 559 (1972)
(discussing "[tlhe difference between changing the rule and finding in a particular case that itdoes not
apply").
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may take this form-that is, there is nothing incoherent or morally
arbitrary about giving legal effect to imperfect rights and obligations,
even within private law.
C.

IMPERFECT SOCIAL RIGHTS AS DERIVATIVE FROM DUTIES OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

I have so far assumed that imperfect social rights exist, and have
been concerned to demonstrate that their content justifies giving them
legal effect notwithstanding their form. But one might concede the
enforceable character of the hypothetical class of rights, but deny that
individuals and not just states bear rights and obligations relating to
broad social structures. Thus, it is appropriate to take a step back and
defend the proposition that the demands of distributive justice are
naturally conceived in terms of individual imperfect duties and rights.
The most influential account of distributive justice today is that
advanced by John Rawls in his book, A Theory of Justice. There, Rawls
argued that justice requires that social institutions secure basic liberties
for all, and then maximize the primary goods (generally useful resources)
of the worst-off group. ° The account describes what a just society looks
like, or more precisely, what justice requires of the basic structure of
society." Because its focus is on institutions that are typically products of
legislative politics, it speaks to citizens reflecting on how they should
vote. In that sense, it is directed to prescribing action on the part of
individuals, and it implies a duty on their part to vote in a way that
supports the demands of justice. But the theory does not demand that
individuals advance the theory of justice in their everyday lives, through
their private transactions. Nor does Rawls' theory of justice primarily
address rights holders, or in particular, those who may have rights
violated under contemporary institutions. Perhaps for this reason,
together with the demographics of Rawls' primary readership, the rights
articulated by Rawls have been less central to the debate about Rawls
than the duties he ascribes to us. 2
Because Rawls does not recognize any direct duties on the part of
citizens either to help achieve justice or to avoid exacerbating injustice, it
is not clear that he would recognize imperfect social duties. Because he
does not speak in terms of social right either, we cannot easily assess the
implications of his theory for imperfect social rights. Given that Rawls
simply does not set forth his theory on these individualized terms, several
possibilities obtain. First, it is possible that Rawls' theory of justice is
70. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 302-03.
71. Id. at 7-9.
72. But see Joseph H. Carens, Rights and Duties in EgalitarianSociety, 14 PoL. THEORY 31, 31
(1986) (stating that "[miost contemporary liberal political theories focus on rights not duties," and
citing Rawls as an example of one such theorist who said "relatively little about duties").
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inconsistent with the recognition of imperfect social rights. Second, it is
possible that his theory implies imperfect social rights but does not speak
to their relationship to private law. Third, this theory could be read to
permit recognition of imperfect social rights in private law. Fourth,
justice might be bifurcated, such that imperfect social rights obtain in one
sphere, but do not properly interfere with the realm of justice in which
private law is located. Last, justice might require recognition of imperfect
social rights. I will argue that the last interpretation is correct, i.e., that
Rawls' compelling account of the demands of justice implies that rights
and responsibilities in private law are qualified by unrealized imperfect
social rights. Imperfect social rights do not extinguish any category of
private law entitlements, but they do modify those commitments by
expanding the scope of individual responsibility under certain
circumstances.
The critical first step is to recognize, as Liam Murphy suggests, that
"legal, political, and other social institutions" do not constitute "a
separate normative realm... but [are] rather ... the means that people
employ the better to achieve their collective political/moral goals."73
While Murphy is concerned with individuals' extra-legal obligations, the
point can also be made with respect to individual obligations derived
from the demands of distributive justice that can and should have legal
effect. It is useful to think of the state as having moral obligations to the
poor, and it is coherent to do so in that the state is a moral agent that can
both make moral claims on others, and is subject to moral claims on it.
However, the state is a moral agent in a more literal sense than is a
natural person. The state is the means by which we fulfill our obligations
to each other. The failure of an agent to carry out the obligations of its
principals does not excuse the principal, at least where the failure is
obvious and the principal is on notice that it is operating in a kind of
breach.
To appreciate the derivative nature of the state's role in distribution
from individuals' direct obligations to each other, it is useful to review
Kant's hypothetical account of the transition from the state of nature to
civil society, and his related notion of provisional property rights-the
rights held by individuals prior to the establishment of civil society.74 The
narrative may not be plausible-nor was it intended to be literal-but it
suggests how the state acts as a moral agent on behalf of individuals, who
bear ultimate responsibility for the demands of distributive justice.

73. Murphy, supra note 9, at 253 (footnote omitted).
74. This is not to suggest that Kant would recognize imperfect social rights or duties as I have
presented them here.
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In Kant's hypothetical account, individuals in the state of nature are
capable of appropriating objects, including land. 5 The trick is explaining
how their unilateral acts of appropriation can bind others, where it is a
postulate of practical reason that one may not unilaterally impose
obligations on another. 6 Physical possession of objects is the easier
(though arguably still troubling) case. The obligation to respect another's
right in what she is physically holding arises from the natural duty to
respect her physical space, and to refrain from compromising her bodily
integrity." More problematic is what Kant calls intelligible possession, or
property rights in objects that are not in physical possession but the
appropriation of which nevertheless binds others."' Kant resolves the
problem of intelligible possession by arguing that all individuals have a
liberty interest in a rule that would recognize such appropriation.79 As
such, they cannot act contrary to that rule even in a state of nature. 8° But
property rights in pre-civil society are tainted by the unilateral character
of the initial appropriation, and do not solidify until the establishment of
civil society, at which time all citizens-through the state-can be said to
have collectively authorized the property entitlements that property
holders previously asserted unilaterally against one another."
75. KANT, supra note 40, at 47-56.
76. "Original acquisition ... is only the result of a unilateralchoice .... It is not easy to see how
an act of choice of that kind could establish what belongs to someone." Id. at 48. "For a unilateral
will . .. cannot put everyone under an obligation that is in itself contingent; this requires a will that is
omnilateral,that is," a lawgiving state in civil society. Id. at 51. Nevertheless, provisional acquisition on
the state of nature
is true acquisition; for, by the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, the
possibility of acquiring something external in whatever condition people may live together
(and so also in a state of nature) is a principle of private right, in accordance with which
each is justified in using that coercion which is necessary if people are to leave the state of
nature and enter the civil condition, which can alone make any acquisition conclusive.
Id. at 52. Thus, appropriation in the state of nature is permitted by way of "the temporary suspension
of a general prohibition in anticipation of the creation of a more just state of affairs." Kenneth Baynes,
Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract,72 MONIST 433, 437 (I989). "[T]his restriction upon
the general prohibition not to limit the freedom of others itself occasions a degree of freedom that
would otherwise not have been possible." Id. at 438.
77. KANT, supra note 40, at 38-39.
78. Id. at 38.
79. See discussion supra note 76.
8o. Characteristically, Kant does not believe that one's obligation in the state of nature to act in
accordance with a property rule that would promote liberty turns on other individuals' compliance
with that rule. He does not recognize, or even sympathize, with the moral collective action problem,
i.e., that one's duty to comport with the best rule may require coordination with others to do the same,
especially where unilateral compliance will result not just in personal disadvantage, but inferior
outcomes. This may be why his account of property rights, or the duty to recognize others' property
rights in the state of nature, may strike many as implausible. However, nothing in my use of Kant turns
on this aspect of his account.
81. KANT, supra note 40, at 45 ("Possession in anticipation of and preparation for the civil
condition.., is provisionally rightful possession, whereas possession found in an actual civil condition
would be conclusive possession." (emphasis omitted)); see also Brian Tierney, Kant on Property: The
Problem of Permissive Law, 62 J. HIsT. IDEAS 301,303 (2OOI).
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Kant points out, though, that the transition to civil society does not
by itself assure reciprocity in the recognition of property. Some citizens
will not have property, or will have too little to live in a state of
independence.2 Since liberty was the justification for a regime of
property, those who do not gain liberty are worse off as a result of
others' newly secured property entitlements. Kant is best understood to
conclude that, in light of this residual lack of reciprocity, the legitimacy
of the transition to civil society depends on a duty on the part of the
newly formed state to provide for the basic needs of the poor.s Property
holders essentially must recognize the state's duty to support the poor,
together with the right to tax in order to be able to do so, in order to
make right their demand that others respect their property claims.8"
The relative ease of the transition into civil society in Kant's account
depends on his relatively weak standards (in a contemporary light) for
the obligations of distributive justice. Because most of us now recognize
greater obligations of distributive justice, the transition from provisional
to peremptory property rights is more problematic. The central question
arises: of what consequence is a failure to meet the obligations of
distributive justice? If the state does not make payment on our behalf,
does our debt go away? It does not. Civil society is not a limited liability
enterprise protecting its members from distributive moral claims. The
above account suggests that there are consequences for private law.
Redistribution through the state may be the primary mechanism by
which we make other social institutions just, but the imperative of just
institutions stems from the need to make just the myriad propertyrelated claims we make on each other.
Distributive injustice gives rise to imperfect social duties and rights
in this way. Speaking of imperfect duties and rights borne by individuals
does not deny that the state is the proper instrument by which to achieve
distributive justice, and that in ideal theory, individuals may not need to
pause to acknowledge the demands of distributive justice on their
transactional plans. But at least in non-ideal theory, where the state has
not achieved distributive justice, individuals have active imperfect social
duties and rights. The demands of distributive justice are not limited to
institutional design.
I have argued that imperfect rights may be given legal effect, and
that there is such a thing as imperfect social rights. Furthermore, I have
proposed the legal form that imperfect social rights should take: a
negative right against conduct that exploits and exacerbates distributive
injustice. This approach situates individual plaintiffs and defendants
82. See KANT, supra note 40,

at 92,
83. See Weinrib, supra note 56.
84. See supra note 51.

1oI.
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within a scheme of distributive justice and gives expression to their
imperfect social rights and duties in a nonmorally arbitrary way. It does
not entail using the administration of private law to directly transfer
money from rich (or some rich) to poor (or some poor) with the aim of
achieving some marginal step toward distributive justice. Rather, it uses
imperfect social rights to create boundaries on morally acceptable
individual behavior, in a society that fails to meet the distributive
obligations of political morality. A duty not to take advantage of
distributive injustice and make it worse probably does not exhaust the
scope of individual moral duty under conditions of distributive injustice;
indeed, it may not exhaust the scope of legally enforceable duty. My aim
has been to establish a duty not to exploit and exacerbate background
injustice, as a minimum.
The next two Parts illustrate and justify how this negative duty and
its correlative right are in fact given effect in private law today,
notwithstanding resistance to the demands of distributive justice within
the domain of private law.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY

The doctrine of unconscionability concedes that contract rights are
not just defeasible upon payment or change of circumstance, but may
give way under the force of imperfect social rights. Specifically, a
contract is voidable where a party exploits and exacerbates distributive
injustice.
While the doctrine of unconscionability is not explicitly framed in
distributive terms, its distributive aspects have been often noted.5
Moreover, viewing unconscionability as derivative from imperfect social
rights helps explain why courts usually do not apply the doctrine to the
benefit of rich victims. More generally, it helps explain why contract law
does not usually recognize as exploitive high prices extracted as a result
of disparate bargaining power, where the disparity does not reflect social
injustice. The stranded driver or skier usually will have to pay a high
price for rescue. A credit-worthy business that finds itself in sudden
desperate need of a loan may be charged a high interest rate. While
courts might limit prices to reduce the cost of the risk-creating activity, or
in order to lower bargaining costs (given that bilateral monopoly often

85. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note

I, at 496; Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies

Movement. 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 625-30 (1983); cf CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACr
(1981) (rejecting use of unconscionability doctrine for distributive purposes).

AS PROMISE

103-06

86. See Philip Bridwell, The PhilosophicalDimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability,70 U.

Cm. L. REV. 1513, 1527 (2003) ("An examination of the cases in which courts have invalidated
contracts under Section 2-302 [of the Uniform Commercial Code] reveals that the appeal to intuitive
conceptions of fairness is most pronounced in cases where the plaintiff is a woman, poor, or the
recipient of governmental aid.").
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characterizes rescues), for the most part, courts-and the common
reader-are less sympathetic to those whose weak bargaining power
reflects bad luck rather than distributive injustice."s
By contrast, a purely procedural take on unconscionability fails to
explain the tendency to treat poor claimants more leniently, unless one
assumes that rich people are uniformly intelligent and well informed, a
hypothesis that experience disproves. While unconscionability is a
narrow doctrine in the common law, its underlying principles are of
wider significance because many statutory interventions in contract law
are essentially transaction-type-specific rules of unconscionability. For
example, laws setting a minimum wage essentially hold that wages below
the specified one are unconscionable. Similarly, regulations excusing
tenant rent obligations where minimum housing standards are not met
implicitly provide that contracts for substandard housing are
unconscionable.
A modern classic in the realm of unconscionability aptly
demonstrates the role of the doctrine in relieving disadvantaged persons
from the obligation to respect certain property entitlements where the
latter are the product of distributive injustice (procedurally
unconscionable), and further reinforce that injustice (substantively
unconscionable). In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., rent-toown stores included cross-collateral clauses in their customer contracts;
the effect of those provisions was that the balance due on every item
purchased continued until the balance due on all items, whenever
purchased, was liquidated. 88 The appellate court emphasized the
background distribution in its analysis, noting that "[w]hether a
meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In
many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross
inequality of bargaining power." ' While the court suggested that the
parties' "obvious education or lack of it" was relevant, the emphasis was
on the inequality of bargaining power that was a direct result of the
disadvantageous
market position occupied by the rent-to-own
9
consumer. 0
The court was not so naYve as to suggest that any contract that
reflected one party's disadvantageous market position would be
unconscionable. Rather, courts should look to "the general commercial
87. But see Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts in the Shadow of No Duty to Rescue,
86 N.C. L. REv. 315, 333-37, 377-78 (2008) (arguing that American contract doctrine, including
unconscionability, currently provides no grounds upon which to invalidate such contracts, but it
should).
88. 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
89. Id. at 449.
9o. Id.
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background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,""
presumably to understand whether the terms actually made the
consumers worse off in light of other market alternatives that were
foregone as a result of the contract at issue, or whether the contract was
as good as it could get for the defendant, and thus not exploitive. Where
a contractual party takes advantage of and reinforces distributive
injustice, imperfect social rights help us to name that conduct as
exploitive. Contract law will not protect the otherwise legitimate
contractual expectations of the exploitive party.
The doctrine of unconscionability, interpreted in this fashion, would
not look radically different than it does today. Two points are worth
emphasizing.9" First, where a good or service is widely purchased on
similar terms, procedural unconscionability will not be present. That is
because it cannot be said under those circumstances that the terms of the
transaction are conditioned on the respective social positions of buyer
and seller. In this respect, procedural unconscionability on this approach
is far narrower than the more conventional interpretation of procedural
unconscionability, which labels every mass contract of adhesion
procedurally unconscionable because of the absence of a meaningful
bargaining process behind it.93 (These contracts are usually not voidable,
however, unless they are also substantively unconscionable.94 )
Second, where there is reason to believe that the market does not
support a more favorable alternative for the disadvantaged party and
similarly situated buyers, substantive unconscionability will not be
present. We can only say that a transaction has exacerbated distributive
injustice by making the plaintiff worse off where there exist other
alternatives which the plaintiff would have pursued were it not for her
dealings with the defendant.9" In these cases, even if the fact of mutual
91. Id. at 450 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Richard Craswell has observed that economists tend to focus on the market as a whole while
non-economists tend to focus on individual transactions. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 6o U. CHI. L. REv. i, 63 (1993). The
accompanying text assesses the moral relevance of market structure for individual transactions.
93. Many courts will deem all contracts of adhesion procedurally unconscionable. See, e.g., Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003); Lozada v. Dale Bake Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d
IO87, i oo (W.D. Mich. 2ooo); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, i162 (Nev. 2004).
94. See Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("In order for
a contract or contract provision to be considered unconscionable, both procedural and substantive
unconscionability must be present."); see also, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P. 3d 669, 69o (Cal. 2000); Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d
252, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo6); Doyle v. Fin. Am., L.L.C., 918 A.2d 1266, 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2007); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998).
95. Relatedly, Wertheimer claims that "when we say that A takes unfair advantage of B, we
typically assume that A could have chosen not to take unfair advantage of B, that their specific
transaction could have occurred on fairer terms. And this is precisely what generally cannot occur in a
perfectly competitive market." WERTHEIMER, supra note 6i, at 217. I prefer to make the point in terms
of the but-for effect of the alleged exploiter on the defendant's options. Wertheimer seems to glide

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o: 105

consent suggests that the disadvantaged party valued what she was
promised more highly than what she agreed to pay (assuming that she
appreciated both), it does not demonstrate that she is better off as a
result of the transaction. It fails to factor in the opportunity costs she96
unintentionally forewent by entering into the transaction at issue.
Taking into account those opportunity costs, the transaction was not
Pareto superior. 7
Where the defendant operates in a competitive market and offers its
goods or services on terms comparable to those of its competitors, it is
presumptively the case that the plaintiff would not have had any better
option, and therefore, her voluntary involvement in the transaction
would suggest that she has not been made worse off as a result of it. In
the usual case of distributive unconscionability, the exploitation is only
possible either because the plaintiff is unaware of superior options, or
because of temporary market conditions under which a competitor with
substantially more favorable terms has not yet fully accessed the market
in which the defendant operates.
By contrast, where the defendant occupies a monopoly position, the
transaction is appropriately subject to greater scrutiny. A monopolist
that markets its products or services widely would be protected under the
first prong, i.e., procedural unconscionability, for the reasons discussed
above.98 A monopolist that markets its products to the socially
disadvantaged is in a more precarious position. In some cases of
monopoly pricing-e.g., in the patent context-it may be the case that
from long-term economic impossibility to impossibility in any given transaction, and it is not obvious
that the former controls. For example, one might imagine that price discrimination could make it
feasible to charge certain customers less. But the possibility of such price discrimination would not
normally create a right to it.
96. In principle, one might say that the very fact that she chose to forego those alternatives
demonstrates her preference for the challenged transaction, and that my discussion attributed
irrationality to the buyer. But to take the position that the buyer preferred an objectively inferior
contract is also to attribute irrationality to the buyer. Usually the buyer is not irrational at all, but
simply does not have the information or other means (e.g., a car) necessary to take advantage of the
alternative.
97. A transaction is Pareto superior if at least one person is better off and no one is worse off. See
RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (6th ed. 2003).

98. It is worth noting the road not taken: one might alternatively argue that in these cases, it is
incumbent on the monopolist, where feasible, to price its product differently in the poorer market.
99. 1 refer to price because it is the term that is most likely to be worse in a noncompetitive
market. See Richard Schmalensee, Market Structure, Durability, and Quality: A Selective Survey, 17
ECON. INQUIRY 177, 182 (1979) (concluding that under certain conditions quality is independent of
market structure). However, there may be circumstances under which the allegedly unconscionable
term is a nonprice term, as was the case in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (in which a cross-collateral security term was at issue). Disputes regarding
nonprice terms can usually be translated into a dispute about the price term. For example, a claim that
a cross-collateral term is unconscionable may really be a claim that the price paid was too high in light
of the cross-collateral term. Even where a monopolist offers products and services that are superior in
quality to those that would likely prevail in a competitive market, we can say that the price paid was
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the monopolist has not made things worse for the plaintiff and others
similarly situated, because the "excess" profits were necessary to give
incentive to the monopolist to develop the good or service. Whether this
is the case, or whether instead the monopolist has targeted the
disadvantaged group for reasons the buyers would not endorse, is a
tough empirical question. It is not, however, a novel one. It maps on to
existing legal inquiries; its pitfalls are familiar."
The approach to unconscionability I have outlined here is not
intended to be exhaustive. There are no doubt cases that merit rescission
on grounds of unconscionability, in which imperfect social rights play no
part. However, most unconscionability cases are marked by background
distributive injustice, and it is worth pausing to explore the advantages of
the above approach. First and foremost among those advantages is the
absence of any need to characterize the defendant's consent to the initial
transaction as involuntary-contrary to all intuitions, including the selfunderstanding of the defendant. I"' Ignorance of a contract term or
market price does not suffice to render consent to a contract involuntary.
Otherwise, the vast majority of contracts would lack consent. Compared
to prevailing accounts of unconscionability, the proposed distributive
account of unconscionability focuses less on the defendant seeking to
avoid a contract, and more on the plaintiff, i.e., on the party alleged to

too high as compared to what most consumers would be willing to pay for those goods and services
where the optimal level of quality was also available at a competitive price.
ioo. We might be concerned about having courts adjudicate antitrust issues in the context of
contract claims. See Posner, supra note 6, at 296; Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1075-76 (977). But it is not clear why, in cases of
consequence, there cannot be public interest and class action litigation regarding unconscionability as
there is in antitrust. It may also be the case that an antitrust claim implicates a different set of facts and
standards than those appropriate to a contract claim, since the plaintiff and the remedy sought both
differ.
ioi. See Richard Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, I8 J.L. & EcoN. 293, 294-95
(0975) ("[Unconscionability] should be used only to allow courts to police the process whereby private
agreements are formed, and in that connection, only to facilitate the setting aside of agreements that
are as a matter of probabilities likely to be vitiated by the classical defenses of duress, fraud, or
incompetence."); John Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 654 (994) ("The exculpatory
nature of exploitation has to do with its effect upon the subjective ability of the party to reason and to
act freely and voluntarily."); see also Philip Bridwell, supra note 86, at 1526-27 (observing how courts
implausibly tend to infer a defect in the mental processes of a party from the presence of unfavorable
terms); Kronman, supra note I, 477-78, 485-89 (arguing that the notion of voluntarism is vague and
ultimately requires background equity; thus, libertarians committed to giving effect only to voluntary
transactions must be egalitarians too). While the principle of autonomy does not call for the
enforcement of all commitments just by virtue of the fact that they were voluntarily entered, even to
the extent autonomy is well-served by the enforcement of contractual promises that were voluntarily
made, Seana Shiffrin has persuasively argued that it does not follow that the state's considerations end
there. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 223 (2000) ("[V]iewing autonomous agreements as worthy of respect does not
entail relinquishing one's own capacities to exercise independent moral judgment or to set distinct
priorities for action.").
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have exploited and exacerbated distributive injustice.' °2 Starting from the
premise that it is morally impermissible-or at least undesirable-to
impose an exceptional liability on a person in the absence of a
nonmorally arbitrary reason, it makes sense to narrow the conditions for
distributive liability to ones where the defendant has acted in a way that
makes him specifically responsible for plaintiff's loss.
The interest in avoiding moral arbitrariness is symmetrical, in that
we should also wish to avoid conferring a windfall on certain members of
the class of disadvantaged persons. However, the operation of
responsibility is not symmetrical. Responsibility should be taken as a
necessary condition of legal liability, or the suspension of one's ordinary
legal rights; but the absence of responsibility on the part of the party
asserting liability or seeking such a suspension (by avoiding contract on
grounds of unconscionability) is neither necessary nor sufficient. Not
only may we wish to compensate a victim for losses for which she was
partially responsible, but also we may not even wish to reduce
compensation to reflect the measure of her responsibility. If we think
responsibility for an event can be allocated among persons in a zero-sum
manner, a policy of compensating or awarding relief to individuals under
certain circumstances would imply that their alleged exploiters are to
that very extent not responsible for the loss at issue. But if we think
responsibility turns on conduct rather than consequences, it should not
surprise us that there is no fixed amount of moral responsibility for a
given loss to be distributed among the relevant actors.
Thus, asserting that an exploiter is responsible for the loss he would
have willingly imposed on a socially disadvantaged person is not to imply
that the victim was not also responsible for her loss, let alone incapable
of such responsibility. Alleged exploiters are not responsible only where
their conduct is coercive, i.e., where it deprives their victims of
responsibility for transactional outcomes. Inasmuch as my argument
appeals to autonomy, it is indirect. Individuals have an autonomy interest
in their political community respecting their imperfect social rights. But I
am not concerned here with individuals' autonomy interests as
endangered by specific transactions. I am not limiting myself to those
transactions which, if allowed, would momentarily deprive victims of
agency altogether. Far less drastic conditions warrant liability on
distributive grounds, and indeed, unconscionability is repeatedly found
present in transactions between fully functional moral agents.
Nor does the distributive approach overextend a limited doctrine (at
least in common law). As discussed above, most cases of distributive
102. Plaintiff and
defendant are switched in the unconscionability context because
unconscionability is normally asserted as a defense. See Posner, supra note 6, at 3o8 (listing
unconscionability as a defense).

November 2008]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

unconscionability are recognizable under existing unconscionability
doctrine. A distributive approach would not carve out an entirely
different set of cases as candidates for unconscionability. For the most
part, such an approach would reinterpret the principles that motivate
existing law in order to secure for it a more compelling and plausible
normative foundation.
IV.

CAUSATION IN MASS TORT

The demands of distributive injustice also help us make sense of a
more specific phenomenon in the application of private law: the
relaxation of the causation analysis in class action torts. It is not my aim
to persuade the reader that such relaxation takes place, but to point to
various observations and apparent instances of the practice, and then
suggest how imperfect social rights may help us to understand it. To the
extent the reader is left unpersuaded that distributive considerations
explain judicial behavior in this context, either because the cases are
adequately explained on other grounds, or because distributive
considerations do not adequately predict those cases in which causation
is relaxed, the reader is invited to treat the following as an elaboration of
a hypothetical situation in which distribution might matter.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that rational and fair
compensation for victims of asbestos exposure is best achieved by the
legislature.'" But the United States Congress has yet to pass legislation
that would establish an administrative alternative to the courts.' 4
Interestingly, notwithstanding certain procedural barriers to judicial
resolution erected by the Supreme Court, the judiciary has not abdicated
its role in sorting through asbestos claims, but rather continues to be the
primary venue for handling asbestos claims.' In playing this part, courts
have not even grasped at whatever legal doctrines they might have used
to quickly dismiss large numbers of claims. Rather, they apy ear to have
bent over backwards to arrive at plaintiff-friendly solutions.
Jane Stapleton recently identified what she calls "two causal
fictions" in asbestos law." First, courts use a "substantial factor"
103. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (997).
104. See Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Bill Is Sidelined by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at

CI.
105. For example, federal courts have heard several cases related to asbestos claims this year,
including Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237, 242 ( 3 d Cir. 2008), a class action suit on behalf of asbestosis
victims.
io6. For example, the lawsuit in Huber bounced back and forth between the trial and appellate
courts with the appellate court each time ruling in a manner that allowed the litigants to stay in court.
Id. at 242-43, 25 1-52.
107. Jane Stapleton, Two Causal Fictionsat the Heartof U.S. Asbestos Doctrine, 122 LAW Q. REV.
189, 191, 193 (2006).
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approach in asbestos cases.' ° The "substantial factor" approach is
applicable to diseases that operate by a threshold mechanism where
there is no injury until the accumulated dose exceeds some threshold.'"
However, it cannot be said that all of the asbestos products used by a
particular plaintiff contributed to her mesothelioma." ° Thus, the
application of the "substantial factor" test rests on a fiction about the
relationship between exposure and disease contraction."' Second, courts
treat the asbestos disease as if the severity of the disease were dose
independent, or as though there were an indivisible injury." ' This too is a
"scientific fiction" as applied to asbestosis."3 Whether or not one believes
the fictions to be sufficiently scientifically grounded, Stapleton's
observations do suggest that courts are explicitly treating asbestos
differently than other formally analogous tort claims." 4 For example, in
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the court itself characterized the
substantial factor test as "formulated to aid plaintiffs as a broader rule of
causality than the 'but for' test.""..5 It observed that "generally applicable
standard instructions on causation are insufficient" in the asbestos
context, and thus held that:
[P]laintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by
demonstrating that the plaintiff's exposure to defendant's asbestoscontaining product in reasonable medical probability was a substantial
factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or
decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing
asbestos-related cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers
from the defendant's particular product were the ones,
or among the
6
ones, that actually produced the malignant growth."
There is no reason to believe that such plaintiff sympathy is limited to
the asbestos context."7 Rather, it is likely to arise wherever well-known
io8. In re Manguno, 961 F.2d 533, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that, under Louisiana law,
cigarette smoking and asbestos exposure could be concurrent causes of workers' lung cancer, even if it
was possible that cigarette smoking alone could have caused cancer); see also Stapleton, supra note
107, at 191.

to9. Stapleton, supra note 107, at 191.
sto. Id.
iIi. Id. at 191-92.
112.
Id. at 193. Stapleton points out that part of the reason the United States may be plaintiff
friendly in this area is that because most employees are barred from suing their employer in tort;
injured workers sue other parties in order to access tort-level damages. Id. at 194; cf.COLEMAN, supra
note 42, at401-04 (1992) (explaining that the rights and duties of corrective justice may depend on the

absence of other institutional measures that ensure victims receive appropriate compensation for their
wrongful losses).
113. Stapleton, supra note 107, at 193.
114. Id. at 193-94.
115. 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997).

116. Id. at 1219 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
117. Consumer fraud suits involving plaintiffs who are socially disadvantaged as a class may also
benefit from relaxed standards. See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F. 3 d 508 (2d
Cir. 2005) (claiming consumption of the chain's food caused obesity and serious related health
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demographic facts make painfully clear that a "mass" injury is in fact
disproportionately the loss of those who had relatively little to begin
with. I
The introduction of distributive concerns at the stage of rule
application is more controversial than at the stage of rule formation.
Anthony Kronman, in the context of a piece defending the use of
contract regulation to advance distributive ends, seems inclined to agree
that "in particular cases judges and others charged with responsibility for
policing individual transactions should apply established legal rules
regardless of their distributional consequences" on the grounds that
judges cannot properly assess distributional consequences on a case by
case basis and, in any event, to do otherwise would frustrate expectations
and render exchange insecure."9 Similarly, Liam Murphy, in the context
of an article arguing that individuals have duties of justice that bind them
directly (albeit non-coercively), concedes that "[p]eople lead freer and
better lives, facts of normative significance, if they can devote most of
their concerns to their own affairs without always monitoring levels of
well-being or degrees of social inequality .....
But to the extent that the only qualifications on property rights are
broad categorical rules, they are hardly qualifications at all-they are
better characterized as mere definition of the scope of the initial right.
Since the fact of definition is inescapable, it does not require much
justification (though particular definitions do). Certainly, profound
inequality is not necessary to justify the imposition of certain limits on
the scope of property rights. Arguably, though, background injustice and
the corrective imperative it generates is necessary to justify the lesspredictable, but still not unpredictable, character of flexible rules arising
from diatributive injustice.
I would not dispute the common wisdom that intervening in
individual transactions on an ad hoc basis, with the general aim of
achieving a more just distribution of income or wealth, is unpromising

problems, and that chain violated false advertising and deceptive trade practices provisions). While
consumer fraud cases may generally be subject to lower causation standards, I would speculate that

socioeconomicallv disadvantaeed olaintiff classes mav disorooortionatelv benefit from this reduced
burden. A related empirical question is whether the widespread softening of the reliance element in
consumer fraud cases is also related to the distributive implications of consumer fraud litigation. See,
e.g., Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (Mass. 1975); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 8o7, 813 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
its. Some have proposed that proof of causation be abolished generally in the context of mass
toxic torts. See Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (997). Again, whether the cases in which causation is
in fact effectively done away with are disproportionately those in which plaintiffs are
socioeconomically disadvantaged is an empirical question that I cannot resolve here.
119. Kronman, supra note I, at 501.

i2o. Murphy, supra note 9, at 258.
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and unappealing. But there may be patterns in the application of
formally uniform law, as in the asbestos case, which are predictable and
therefore do not realize the worst fears of all those committed to the rule
of law. Predictability may be defined in two related ways. First, we might
say application is predictable ex post where observers of the legal system
accurately predict the results of particular cases. Second, we might say
that application is predictable ex ante when individuals know before they
act what the legal consequences of their considered actions will be. Since
the two senses of predictability are but two ways of characterizing the
same state of affairs, it is not necessary to choose between them. But it is
really predictability in the second sense that is important to individual
freedom.' 2' The question is, then, does the introduction of distributive
concerns at the stage of application leave individuals without notice of
potential liability?
It does not. The individuals whose rights or responsibilities are
altered as a result of distributive claims are not unfairly surprised. They
are not only on notice of the general obligations of distributive justice,
but in the account I have set forth, imperfect social duties manifest
themselves in private law only where the poverty of one party
conditioned the conduct of the other. For example, in contract,
distributive justice affects claims where one party has exploited the other
in a way that she is unlikely to do without knowledge of the fact of
exploitation.
Given that intentionality is not a prerequisite for liability in tort, the
nature of the notice requirement in this context is necessarily weaker
than in contract, but here, too, one might say that persons act with
knowledge of the kinds of risks to which they expose some known class
of potential victims, and the caution with which they proceed should
reflect in part the particular vulnerabilities and related claims of that
class. If a class of potential victims is marked by a disadvantaged social
position, it is often (but not always) the case that social disadvantage is
causally related to a higher degree of exposure to the risk at issue. One
might argue that a defendant in such a tort case cannot be held
responsible for the additional measure of distributive injustice that his
negligence creates because he did not act with the aim, or perhaps even
actual knowledge, that his conduct would have this distributive effect.
But so long as the distributive effect is as foreseeable as the primary
harms for which his conduct is labeled a tort, he is no more or less
responsible for those distributive consequences than for those other

121. One might also value predictability because it is a prerequisite to the assessment of particular
judgments. It may be that without some public means, i.e., a common reference point, with which to
pronounce judgments fair, they are not. See Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality and Publicity, 27
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 225, 246 (1998) ("[Jjustice must be seen in order to be done.").

November 2008]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE & PRIVATE LAW

harms. For example, the driver of a large, luxury automobile may not
intend to target drivers of inexpensive automobiles when she drives
negligently. But under certain circumstances, it might be appropriate to
hold her to a higher standard of conduct vis-A-vis those less-protected
drivers, given that the special danger to which they are exposed, which is
greater than the risk they would pose to her should they engage in
equally negligent driving, is as foreseeable as the base level of danger
created by her negligent driving.
Thus, the limited recognition of imperfect social rights in private law
does not require that individuals go about actively avoiding the
exacerbation of distributive injustice. They need only refrain from
negligent conduct that foreseeably exacerbates the problem. The narrow
scope for imperfect social rights that I have proposed here not only
ensures localized effect, but also ensures that those effects are usually
predictable by those who choose to profit in morally hazardous territory.
These distribution-sensitive liability rules do not involve adjusting
damages to the parties' wealth, but rather take background distributive
injustice into account in setting the rules of conduct, i.e., in deciding what
conduct is permissible (or at least, what conduct is free) and what
conduct will require compensation.'22
There will likely be some residual level of unpredictability that
results from occasional appeal to imperfect social rights to strengthen
certain plaintiff class action claims. This unpredictability is a genuine cost
of taking distributive injustice into account in the adjudication of private
law claims, and it has a negative impact on liberty. But two points are
worth remembering here. First, as Anthony Kronman argued, liberty
trade-offs are inevitable in all distributive enterprises.'23 That is not a
special consequence of taking distributive demands into account in
private law. To the extent taking distributive considerations into account
at the stage of application introduces more unpredictability than would
other means of achieving distributive justice, let us use superior means.
But where the choice is not between private law and public law, but
between private law and nothing, criteria that speak to the relative merits
of tax and transfer are beside the point.
Second, there is a deeper reason why appeal to distributive justice
will result in some measure of unpredictability, and it has liberal
See generally Jennifer Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413
(arguing that, where individuals are risk averse, it is efficient to require a higher level of care
from wealthy defendants, and that defendants should be required to pay a higher level of damages).
Arlen's result turns on the fact that a marginal increase in care is less burdensome for a wealthy
defendant due to decreasing marginal utility of wealth. Id. at 422-23. Her results apply wherever the
defendant is of greater wealth than the victim; more generally, defendant's wealth is relevant wherever
there is a difference between injurer and victim's wealth. Id. at 426.
123. See Kronman,supra note i, at 506.
122.

(1992)
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implications. Wherever an area of law is motivated by multiple,
overlapping principles that are not reducible to one another, this
pluralism is likely to result in some unpredictability because individual
actors within the system rank the motivating principles differently, or
even fail to recognize some of those principles." For example, one judge
may believe that economic efficiency is the supreme goal of contract law,
but believe that this aim gives way under the force of imperfect social
rights in some cases. Another judge may believe that tort law is intended
to map on to the natural obligations of individuals who impose loss on
others, and that those pre-political obligations leave no room for
distributive considerations. Still another may believe that, just as moral
culpability is (arguably) necessary but insufficient to justify punishment,
moral responsibility is necessary but insufficient to justify the imposition
of liability in contract or tort.
Moreover, theories of private law differ in their core spheres of
application. In the realm of contract, economic theories may be more
relevant where the parties are corporations, or individuals whose only
relevant interests are economic. Rights-based theories may be more
relevant where the stakes importantly affect individuals' life plans.
Similarly, the paradigmatic tort for legal economists may be a loss of
fungible property, whose market value roughly corresponds to its
owner's valuation. The paradigmatic tort in theories of corrective justice
is a bodily injury or another violation of personal integrity. The
principles of corrective justice and economics are more or less
illuminating and compelling depending on the type of contract or tort at
issue.
While it is useful to attempt to identify and persuade all actors
within our legal system that a single principle animates all of contract and
tort law, the reality is that the shallow consensus on which we can and
must operate reflects multiple commitments.25 Most of the time, those
124. Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1488 (2005)
(referring to "an embarrassment of riches" in contract theory and the "brute fact of theoretical
pluralism"). Oman himself is committed to what he calls the "priority of liberty," which he argues
"suggests that, by and large, promises ought to be enforced in some way." Id. at 1502. He further

concludes that this argues against "employing fairness or distributive justice as a secondary value in
place of efficiency... because practically speaking such goals can only be pursued in contract law by
violating the priority of liberty," that is, by "limiting the ability of parties to bargain away from the
desired distributive outcomes." Id. at 1504-05. Pluralism is not limited to private law theory. See
Sanchirico, supra note I,at 1054 ("To refuse to institute a beneficial policy in a specific instance
because that policy would not have the same effect in all similar instances, with 'similar' suitably
defined, would be to eliminate almost all state action, including the prosecution of criminals and the
compensation of victims.").
125. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 206, 240-41 ("Part of the human moral condition is that we
hold many proper values, some of which will conflict in given cases, and part of the human social
condition is that many values are relevant to the creation of a good world, some of which will conflict
in given cases. Contract law cannot escape these moral and social conditions. In contract law, as in life,
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commitments point toward the same outcome; indeed, only theories that
fit most of the existing doctrine are plausible theories at all. While it is
desirable to thicken the terms of our consensus, we should not take too
lightly the privilege of disagreeing on the foundations of private law.
Pluralism permeates the practice of private law. Making normative space
for distributive justice may cost us some predictability, but it is
fundamentally liberal.
CONCLUSION

The major difficulty in defending the consideration of distributive
injustice in the domain of private law has been justifying the imposition
of liability on a particular defendant, and the award of damages to a
particular plaintiff, based on deficiencies in our collective institutions. I
have used the concept of imperfect rights and duties to situate
individuals within the demands of distributive justice, and to explain how
the legal rights and duties of two persons may be shaped and linked by
distributive injustice. Traditional private law entitlements are not simply
modified to serve humanitarian ends where bankruptcy and the welfare
state are deemed inadequate tools. Rather, distributive injustice is
imbedded in the moral structure of our interpersonal relations, and plays
a direct role in defining the scope of individual responsibility for others'
loss.
While my primary claims have been normative, I have also suggested
that the common law already does give some legal effect to imperfect
rights in our private law. I have offered two examples, but have not
surveyed the practice throughout American private law, as would be
necessary to demonstrate a systemic role for distributive claims. To
understand the actual role that imperfect social rights play, one should
also consider which institutional features make a regime of private law
more susceptible to the demands of distributive justice. It is worth
exploring whether common law systems are more or less likely than civil
law systems to be responsive to the force of imperfect social rights in the
private law context. I suspect that the general sensitivity of a political
culture to distributive issues does not fully explain the particular
response of its private law regime (as apart from its public law regime) to
the problem of inequality. Other relevant factors may include what the
formally recognized sources of private law are (e.g., precedent versus
code), whether private and public law are separately administered, and
more generally, whether the system takes private law to be a part of the
regulatory apparatus of the state or a self-contained system of bilateral
justice.
all meritorious values must be taken into account, even if those values may sometimes conflict, and
even at the expense of determinacy.").
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Taking distributive justice seriously in contemporary society means
taking as our starting point, in any discussion of the means by which we
hope to address it, the present state of distributive injustice. The
relevance of gross background inequality is not merely pragmatic-it is
not just that we should try something new because the instruments on
which we have relied thus far have not delivered satisfactory results. We
need to contemplate how distributive injustice generates claims between
individual persons that might never arise, or arise only rarely, in a
different social structure. I have argued that background injustice creates
moral risk within a private law regime. Some private transactions exploit
and exacerbate background injustice. There is nothing morally arbitrary
in attaching legal consequence to this voluntary conduct. To the contrary,
a failure to recognize such behavior within private law compounds the
initial wrong of distributive injustice.

